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INTRODUCTION: "PLUS <;A
CHANGE
?"t
.

.

.

Stephen B. Burbank*

This is a time of self-conscious attention to legal scholarship
that, although hardly unprecedented, must seem remarkable to
many in the profession. We hear of "malaise" in the academy,1
of the decline of doctrinal scholarship, and more generally, of
the decline of law as an autonomous discipline.2 For some who
believe it, the news may be profoundly disturbing, tolling the
thirteenth hour on entire careers. For others, bearing the
news-and having it believed-may be essential to launching or
sustaining careers.
Most of us, I suspect, are inclined to suspend judgment, in
ured more than most mortals to the harsh reality that there is
little new under the sun. This Symposium furnishes additional
evidence of the wisdom of that posture in the current debates
about continuity and change in legal scholarship.
In today's climate, there is irony in a collection of papers that,
at least as conceived, is devoted to the celebration of "great" law
review articles. Some may think the entire enterprise perverse or
at least a wasted grove. Greatness is, after all, contextual, con
tingent, or in any event in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, if
it is true that legal scholarship has changed or is rapidly chang
ing, and given that the articles discussed precede the millenium,
a collection of value preferences can be of only historical inter
est-perversity for those with an antiquarian bent.
One need not, however, reify the concept of greatness to find
of interest what contemporary scholars find of interest in the
work of their elders.3 Moreover, history ceases to be merely of
t © 1988 Stephen B. Burbank, all rights reserved.
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard
University.

1. See Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
647, 647 (1988).

2. See id. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
3. My apologies to the authors of the works that are celebrated here. If it be any
comfort, I had originally written "predecessors."
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historical interest when-which is usually-it tells us something
relevant to our current situation.
From a historical perspective, the contributions to this Sym
posium provide reason to doubt claims that legal scholarship to
day is vastly different than it was thirty or fifty years ago. Cer
tainly the essays by Professors Hovenkamp4 and Katz,:' treating
articles that dealt with public law and private law in 1960 and
1936 respectively, throw cold water on claims either that eco
nomic insights have only recently been brought to law or, more
grandiosely, that law and economics has only recently been rec
ognized as a discipline. Together, those articles tend to confirm
Mark Tushnet's recent speculation that "[l] egal scholarship in
the United States may simply appropriate from other disciplines
what those disciplines have to offer: institutional economics in
the 1930's, neo-classical microeconomics today. "6 In addition,
they may cause us to wonder what happened to the law in law
and economics.
By the same token, although by a different route, Professor
Peller's critique of Herbert Wechsler's neutral principles, as well
as of the intellectual tradition whence it emanated,7 is more or
less what we would have expected of a legal realist in the 1930's.
There is at least one difference, however. Professor Nelson's cau
tion lest "in responding to ideology, we may become ideologues
ourselves"8-issued to those
concerned
about
empln
cism-comes too late for those as profoundly unconcerned about
facts as are the latter day realists. For both groups, another cau
tion from the same source bears repetition: "Critical analyses
that penetrate ideological characterizations of the legal system
offered by legal elites and powerful interest groups will, by
themselves, have little effect on general perceptions of law or on
policy debates concerning legal change."9
As to "greatness," the skeptical reader will be pleased to find
that this issue is not a collection of attempts to define that con
cept in the context of legal literature. It does include, however,
some substantial attempts to tease out why the articles under
4. Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 515 (1988).
5. Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Dam
ages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541 (1988).
6. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship in the United States: An Overview, 50 Mon. L. REv.
804, 805 (1987).
7. Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988).
8. Nelson, Ideology, Scholarship, and Sociolegal Change: Lessons from Galanter and
the "Litigation Crisis," 21 LAw & Soc'v REv. 677, 690-91 (1988).
9. ld. at 690.
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discussion have been acclaimed, have had an impact on legal de
velopment, or have otherwise achieved importance in the eyes of
the audience to which they were addressed.Some of the authors
thus also speak indirectly, as Professors Richman and Reynolds
speak directly/0 to reasons for the opposite phenomena: lack of
acclaim or impact. The lessons I take away are sobering.
It comes as no surprise that frequency of citation is a poor
measure of impact;11 alas, citation may not even guarantee that
the author has read the cited article. Nor should it be surprising
that when a prominent author's goal is directly to affect legal
development and that author offers both a more sophisticated
analytical framework and simple rules, public authorities should
find the rules congenial.12 But what are we to make of the ac
claim greeting an article that, as described in these pages, is
"highly impressionistic,"13 "bereft of any doctrinal presump
tion,"14 and "a bit of ft.uff''?11� Putting together Professor Mar
cus's candid and thorough evaluation of Abram Chayes's work16
with Professor Neuman's wonderful evaluation of Henry
Monaghan's "backfires,"17 one might conclude that the surest
route to acclaim or recognition is to avoid ambiguity, subtlety,
rough edges-to avoid, that is, what for many of us distinguishes
scholarship from journalism. That would, I think, miss a critical
distinction that has to do with audience.
Chayes's article, according to Professor Marcus, has had no
discernible impact in the courts, probably because it was reso
lutely adoctrinal.18 Monaghan's articles had effects in the court
that counts, albeit not those he intended, because they were doc
trinal and because the author discussed alternative approaches
that could be appropriated without the author's qualifications,
including qualifications the author did not think it necessary to
develop.19
Simple rules, paradigms, or analytical frameworks need not be
simplistic, but they are at risk of simplification. They also invite
10. Richman & Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 623 (1988).
11. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 655.
12. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 517 . At the time (1960), the "prominence" of
the author (Derek Bok) arose from two facts: He was a member of the Harvard Law
School faculty, and he was publishing in the Harvard Law Review.
13. Marcus, supra note 1, at 652.
14. !d. at 691; see also id. at 652 ("almost bereft of trad itional doctrinal analysis").
15. !d. at 691.
16. !d. passim.
17. Neuman, Law Review Articles That Backfire, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 697 (1988).
18. Marcus, supra note 1, at 648.
19. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 718-20.
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refinement and elaboration and may, as Professor Marcus de
scribes20 and Professor Katz demonstrates,21 have considerable
generative force. But that is not, at least today, the work of
courts. In appropriating as well as in rejecting the fruits of
scholarship, judges are guided by what "fill[s] the[ir] needs."22 A
scholar whose rules, paradigms, or analytical frameworks are not
simple and who aspires to do more than titillate his colleagues
should consider moonlighting as a journalise3 or, as the contri
bution by Dean Hoeflich and Mr. Perelmuter may suggest,24 be
coming the author of a casebook.
For me, in other words, the contributions to this Symposium
both illustrate a tension inherent in the work of legal scholarship
and demonstrate that it has long been with us. That tension,
explored by Professor Kronman,26 arises from our training as,
and our training of, advocates on the one hand and our aspira
tion to seek knowledge and (dare I say it) truth on the other.
Moreover, I see in the reaching out to other disciplines not sim
ply, and not primarily, the desire to "legitimate . . . the legal
academy as a place properly attached to a university and not
just a professional training ground,"26 but a search for help in
mediating that tension. Finally, in both Professor Hovenkamp's
and Professor Marcus's contributions, I find (perhaps because I
was looking for it) confirmation that what may be the greatest
source of help remains largely untapped-empiricism. 27 As to
that, most of us are prisoners of our educations. If that were not
enough, the mishaps of the realists provide a healthy deterrent.
And then there is the work involved. Life is so much easier in an
air-conditioned office, or at worst a library (with janitors and re-

20.

Marcus, supra note 1, passim.

21.

Katz, supra note 5, passim.

22.

Richman & Reynolds, supra note 10, at 646.

23.
19.

See Burbank, Tolling the Statute in a Federal Case, Nat'! L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at

24.

Hoeflich & Perelmuter, The Anatomy of a Leading Case: Lawrence v. Fox in the

Courts, the Casebooks, and the Commentaries, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 721 (1988).

25. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955
(1981).
26.

Tushnet, supra note 6, at 817.

27. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 539; Marcus, supra note 1, at 691-94. After
writing this Introduction, but before it went to the printer, I came across a very interest
ing article that explores this possibility in depth: Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of
Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
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search assistants).28 Up may be down in the untidy world
outside,29 but, by God, we know where our navels are.
There is hope. Fifteen years ago, Marc Galanter could not
place in a law review an article that, as we now know, could
comfortably have been the subject of commentary in this issue.30
One of the letters of rejection (from Yale Law Journal editor
Robert B. Reich) observed:
We have found your general analysis of legal systems,
and the parts played therein by "RPs" [repeat players]
and "OSs" [one shotters] to be both fascinating and well
written. But does the model conform to empirical study,
or even to what we can observe about the legal system?
Since the demise of the Hughes, and Vinson courts, the
legal system has proven itself more sensitive to the de
mands for legal change from minority interests than any
other branch of our government. The liberal use of class
actions, amicus briefs, and advocacy groups has given rise
to a constant reformist pressure toward rule changes
which favor the "have nots. " The great irony of our time
may be, as Skelly Wright contends, that the "haves," in
cluding large institutions, are taking refuge in our more
political "representative" forums, while individualized
and autonomous interests in our society have increasingly
come to look to courts for the protection and articulation
of their own goals. 31
Great ironies are also in the eye of the beholder. Marc Ga
lanter no longer has such trouble in placing his work in law re
views, 32 and he and his colleagues are now taken seriously

28. See Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. RE v 763, 774-75
(1986).
.

29. See Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 465
(1984).
30.

Galanter, Why the "Haues" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of

Legal Change, 9 LA W & Soc'y RE v. 95 (1974).

31. Letter from Robert B. Reich to Marc Galanter (May 9, 1972) (copy on file with U.
MICH. J.L. REF.). For a brief account of Galanter's travail in having this article published,
see This Week's Citation Classic, 5 CuRRENT CoNTENTS: Soc. & BEHAVIORAL Sci. 24
(1983).
32.

See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and

Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983).
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enough to be publicly dismissed by a Chief Justice of the United
States. 33 That is progress.
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33. See W. Burger, Opening Remarks at 63rd Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute (May 13, 1986), reprinted in 63 A.L.I. PROC. 32, 34 (1987). But see Galanter,
Chief Justice Burger: Review the Facts, Legal Times, Sept. 29, 1986, at 14.

